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Selected Development in California Law
Long Beach City Employees
Association v. City of Long Beach:
Truth or Consequences?
In Long Beach City Employees Association v. City of Long
Beach,' the California Supreme Court held that all employers in
the public sector are prohibited from compelling a public employee
to sit for a polygraph examination. 2 Prior to Long Beach, all
public employees, with the exception of public safety officers, were
subject to involuntary polygraph testing. 3 In Long Beach, the
California Supreme Court ruled that requiring a public employee
who is not a public safety officer to submit to a polygraph test
intrudes upon the individual's privacy and unconstitutionally den-
ies the public employee equal protection of the law. 4
Part I of this Note summarizes the facts of Long Beach City
Employees Association v. City of Long Beach and reviews the
opinion. Part II examines the legislative history of Labor Code
section 432.2 and Government Code section 3307, and discusses
the reliability of the polygraph test. Finally, part III explores the
possible legal ramifications of the decision in Long Beach.
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In the summer of 1982, administrators of the Long Beach Marine
Bureau, 5 an agency of the City of Long Beach, discovered that
1. 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d. 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
2. Id. at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
3. California Labor Code § 432.2, enacted in 1963, statutorily immunized private
employees and job applicants from involuntary polygraph testing. Public employees were
expressly exempted from the statutory restriction. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp. 1986).
California Government Code § 3307, enacted 13 years after Labor Code § 432.2, further
safeguarded public safety officers from involuntary polygraph testing at the workplace. Section
3307 provides that no public safety officer shall be required to submit to a polygraph
examination. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980).
4. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
5. "The [Long Beach Marine] Bureau is a subdivision of the Long Beach Tidelands
407
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money was missing from toll boxes at four boat launch locations. 6
The administrators of the Bureau suspected that one or more of
the marina employees possessing keys to the toll machines were
stealing the money.7 The police began an investigation, and inter-
rogated several marina employees. 8 The criminal investigation was
soon terminated for lack of sufficient evidence. 9 As part of the
Bureau's continuing administrative search for the guilty party, the
Bureau directed twenty-six employees who had access to the toll
boxes to sit for polygraph tests.' 0 A polygraph examination reg-
isters the examinee's physiological responses, triggered by the
examinee's emotional arousal, to a series of questions."I The ques-
tions include both control questions and inquiries regarding the
object of the investigation. 2 The examiner interprets the recorded
responses to determine the truthfulness of the examinee's answer.' 3
Agency." Id. at 941, 719 P.2d at 662, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 92. The Long Beach Tidelands Agency
is a city agency. Marina operations are administered by the Marine Bureau, which rents,
maintains, and guards all boat slips and Marina facilities. The Marina is patrolled by land
and water on a 24-hour basis by the patrol staff. Lifeguard and rescue boat service is also
provided on a 24-hour basis to handle firefighting and medical emergencies, and the enforcement
of city and state ordinances applicable to Marina activities. Other marina employees provide
administrative and facility services. Telephone interview held with the Long Beach Tidelands
Agency (August 21, 1986) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
6. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 942, 719 P.2d at 662, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
7. Id. The Bureau's suspicion of marina employees was based on the fact that the
machines did not appear to have been forcibly broken open. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in Employment,
21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 297-98 (1984). The polygraph test, popularly referred to as a lie
detector test, is based on the supposition that lying causes internal conflict. The internal
conflict, in turn, results in measurable and distinguishable physiological changes in pulse rate,
blood pressure, perspiration rate, and breathing amplitude. Id.; see also Hayden, Employers
Who Use Lie Detector Tests, 41 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 16, 16-18 (1982); Kleinmetz, Trial By
Polygraph, Trial, Sept. 1985, at 32, 33-35; Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence:
An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 699-700 (1961); Comment, Regulation of
Polygraph Testing in the Employment Context: Suggested Statutory Control on Test Use and
Examiner Competence, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 113, 116-17 (1981).
12. Gardner, supra note 11, at 298.
13. Skolnick, supra note 11, at 705-06. In a typical examination, the subject is invited
into a private waiting room by a receptionist who says the examiner will be ready in a few
minutes. At this stage, the test has already begun. The receptionist offers the subject reading
material describing the lie detector as a virtually unerring instrument. The initial hypothesis,
guilty or not guilty, is based upon the receptionist's report of the examinee's reactions to this
literature. Id. at 704. The examiner then enters the testing room and asks the examinee a
variety of questions about matters that could possibly affect the reliability of the test. Gardner,
supra note 11, at 298. The line of questioning may include inquiries about drug usage or
whether the examinee has any history of mental illness. See, e.g., Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at
945, 719 P.2d at 664, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (providing samples of questions asked in pretest
interview). Following the interview, the examinee is attached to the lie-detecting device. The
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When the Marine Bureau ordered the employees to take polygraph
exams, each worker refused.' 4 The City Employees Association (CEA)
was contacted to represent the interests of the employees.' The CEA
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a temporary restraining order.
6
Under threat of dismissal, all but one of the employees took a
polygraph examination. 7 Bureau officials became frustrated and dis-
trustful due to the employees' general lack of cooperation and
reluctance to take the test.'
Following the denial by the Long Beach Superior Court of CEA's
request for injunctive relief, the CEA appealed.19 The Court of
Appeal for the Second District affirmed the ruling of the trial court.20
examiner begins by asking a series of questions. Generally, three types of questions are asked
of the examinee: Relevant, irrelevant, and control questions. The "relevant" question addresses
the specific- issue under investigation, and the response is measured against the control and
irrelevant questions baseline. The "control" question reflects an examinee's deceptive response,
while the "irrelevant" questions test for an indication of an examinee's truthful response.
Gardner, supra note 11, at 298. For example, the examiner might ask, "Did you steal my
watch?" (a crime which had never been committed). In all probability, the examinee would
truthfully respond, "No." This answer would then provide the examiner with a recorded
response to a truthful answer.
A typical investigative control question in a theft investigation would be, "Have you ever
stolen anything?" If the suspect says no, the examiner asks, "You mean in your whole life?"
In cases in which the examinee adamantly denies ever having stolen anything at any time, the
examiner asks, "Did you ever try to steal anything?" Since most people are culpable of some
form of theft, even something as slight as taking pens from the workplace could cause anxiety.
Therefore, responding in the negative to a control question is presumed to be a deceptive
answer that should be detected by the polygraph. Generally, the control question is not related
to the incident under investigation. Nevertheless, a truthful answer might incriminate the
examinee on a matter not relevant to the investigation. Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective
Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing,
47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 81 (1971).
14. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 942, 719 P.2d at 662, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
15. CEA (City Employees Association) is the exclusive representative of City employees
under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in a variety of bargaining units. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500-
3510 (West 1980). The court rejected the defendant's (City) contention that the CEA had no
standing to assert the employees' privacy rights. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 941 n.3, 719 P.2d
at 661 n.3, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.3.
16. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 942, 719 P.2d at 662, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
17. Only one employee continued to refuse to take the polygraph test. He had been
employed by the Bureau for fifteen years and was president of the Harbor Patrol Officers
Association. Id. at 943, 719 P.2d at 662, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
18. Id. at 942, 719 P.2d at 662, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 92. One employee who volunteered for
early testing subsequently refused when the examiner attached the instruments to his body.
This employee also became very upset when he was allegedly asked about his sexual background.
Another employee insisted upon stating for the record that he was only taking the test under
protest and as a result of duress. A third worker's test was inconclusive because of extreme
nervousness, and another worker deliberately attempted to thwart the exam by controlling his
breathing. Id.
19. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Respondent filed by the City and County of San Francisco
at 2, Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d
660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
20. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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The California Supreme Court granted the CEA's petition for review
and reversed. 2
B. The Opinion
The supreme court focused primarily on two issues. The court first
addressed whether compulsory polygraph testing at the workplace
violated a public employee's constitutional right to privacy.2 Second,
the court considered whether Labor Code section 432.2 and Govern-
ment Code section 3307 unconstitutionally denied a public employee
equal protection of the law.23 The court answered both questions
affirmatively. 24
1. The Right to Privacy
The California Supreme Court held that compulsory polygraph
testing invaded the worker's right to privacy .2 The court, however,
did not consider whether the invasion was warranted by a compelling
state interest.26 Therefore, the court did not fully address whether
compulsory polygraph testing was an unconstitutional invasion of
the worker's right to privacy.27 The Long Beach court instead deter-
mined that compulsory polygraph testing intrudes upon the funda-
mental right to privacy and engaged in an equal protection analysis
of the statutory scheme exposing public employees to involuntary
polygraph testing. 28
The court in Long Beach contemplated the scope of activities
protected by the provision of the California Constitution that ensures
the right to privacy. 29 The court in Long Beach0 principally relied
21. Id.
22. Id. at 943, 719 P.2d at 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93. See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § I
(added in 1974 to provide California citizens with the constitutional right to privacy).
23. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal, Rptr. at 96. See also U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws").
24. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 948 n.12, 719 P.2d at 666 n.12, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96 n.12. "Since CEA relies
primarily on its contention that Bureau employees were denied equal protection, we need not
decide at this juncture whether their right of privacy was improperly violated irrespective of
the legislative classifications that exempt private sector employees and all 'public safety officers'
from involuntary polygraph testing." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
29. See id. at 943, 719 P.2d at 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (citing CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § I
(the right to privacy)).
30. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 943, 719 P.2d at 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
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upon the interpretation of the California Constitutional right to
privacy in White v. Davis." In White, the court held that the state
constitution provides citizens with a legally enforceable right to
privacy and determined that a governmental invasion of a citizen's
privacy must be justified by a compelling state interest.3 2
In Long Beach, the California Supreme Court recognized that an
individual's thoughts and feelings are foremost among the activities
safeguarded by the California Constitutional right to privacy.33 The
court evaluated whether the polygraph examination intrudes upon
constitutionally protected mental processes.14 After reviewing the
typical administration of a polygraph test, the supreme court ex-
pressed concern over the extent of information unwittingly revealed
by the examinee during each phase of the testing.35
According to the United States Supreme Court decision in Gardner
v. Broderick,3 6 an employee may be compelled to disclose information
regarding work-related matters or face dismissal.37 In Gardner, a
police officer was fired when he refused to waive his privilege against
self-incrimination before a grand jury investigating corruption in the
police force." The United States Supreme Court held that the police
31. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d. 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975).
32. Id. In White, the California Supreme Court used the election ballot brochure to
identify the aims of the privacy amendment. The brochure presented to the voters in the 1974
election identified the following objectives: (I) prevent "government snooping"; (2) stop the
overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government and
business interests; (3) eradicate the improper use of information obtained for a proper purpose;
and (4) establish reasonable checks on the accuracy of existing information. Id. at 774, 533
P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
33. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 944, 719 P.2d at 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93. See also
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 198, 207 (1890); Hermann,
supra note 13, at 127-28.
34. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 944-47, 719 P.2d at 663-66, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93-96.
35. See supra note 13 (explanation of polygraph process).
36. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). At a minimum, states must apply constitutional standards set
by the United States Supreme Court for those provisions of the United States Constitution
deemed applicable to the states. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548, 531 P.2d 1099,
1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328 (1975).
37. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278. See also Uniform Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc., v. Commis-
sioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 285 (1968) (sanitation employees could not be dismissed
for refusing to waive constitutional rights against self-incrimination in future criminal pro-
ceeding, but could be fired for refusing to account for performance when no constitutional
right was at stake); Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Educ., 44 Cal. 2d 816, 823-25, 285
P.2d 617, 621-22 (1955) (state college professor was not entitled to reinstatement after dismissal
for failing to respond to questions concerning his affiliation with the Communist party), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956); Szmaciarz v. State Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 918, 145
Cal. Rptr. 396, 403 (1978) (correctional officer, suspended for marijuana use, was subject to
dismissal for refusing to testify about activities at a formal administrative hearing).
38. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 274. The officer was advised of his privilege against self-
incrimination under both the United States Constitution and the New York Constitution. Id.
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officer could not be dismissed solely for his refusal to waive a
constitutional right.3 9 Dismissal would have been warranted, however,
if the officer had refused to answer questions that were specifically,
directly, and narrowly related to the performance of his duties. 40 The
California Supreme Court in Long Beach agreed that an employee
may be required to answer questions specifically and narrowly related
to work .4  Nevertheless, the Long Beach court distinguished the
intrusive and pervasive nature of the polygraph examination from
the traditional method of verbal interrogation conducted in Gardner
and its progeny.42 The court concluded that the polygraph exam
technique inherently requires a broader line of questioning. 43 Further-
more, the examiner is able to perceive thoughts and emotions not
generally conveyed in a verbal interrogation. 4
The Long Beach court concluded the analysis of the privacy issue
by holding that compulsory polygraph testing invades the worker's
right to privacy. 45 The court did not go on to determine whether a
compelling state interest justified this invasion because the CEA had
primarily argued that employees were denied equal protection of the
law. 46 Therefore, the court considered only whether compulsory poly-
graph testing infringed upon a fundamental right 47 as a preliminary
determination in an equal protection analysis. 41
39. Id. at 279.
40. Id. at 278.
41. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 946, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
42. Two primary factors make the polygraph exam far more intrusive than the verbal
interrogation used in Gardner. First, the polygraph cannot differentiate between such emotions
as guilt and anxiety. Therefore, feelings not necessarily relevant to the work issue under
investigation are revealed. Second, the polygraph records physiological responses even when
the employee does not verbally answer the question. Hermann, supra note 13, at 84-85; see
also Comment, supra note 11, at 117-18 n.12; Gardner, supra note 11, at 305.
43. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 946, 947, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 948 n.12, 956, 719 P.2d at 666 n.12, 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96 n.12, 102 (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (the right to privacy).
48. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96. When state
legislation affects a fundamental right, the general requirement that the state need only show
that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving a legitimate state purpose is
not applicable. Instead, the state must show the classification is "necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest." Thus, the court uses a stricter standard of scrutiny in determining the
constitutionality of the challenged legislation when a fundamental right is involved. City of
Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8
(1970).
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2. Equal Protection of the Laws
The supreme court began the equal protection analysis in Long
Beach by identifying the dual legislative classifications set forth in
two California statutes. 49 Labor Code section 432.2 prohibits private
employers from requiring their employees to submit to polygraph
exams.5 0 Section 432.2, however, is specifically inapplicable to public
employers." Furthermore, Government Code section 3307 immunizes
public safety officers from having to take polygraph exams.
5 2
Generally, a legislative classification need only be rationally related
to achieving a legitimate state purpose to withstand an equal protec-
tion challenge.5 1 If the classification affects a fundamental right, the
state must show that the classification is narrowly drawn to further
a compelling state interest. 54 In Long Beach, the court determined
that compulsory polygraph testing infringed upon the employee's
fundamental right to privacy. 5 The City, therefore, had the burden
of establishing that a compelling state interest necessitated the legis-
lation that exposed public employees to compulsory polygraph test-
ing.5 6
Three years earlier in Civil Service Association v. Civil Service
Commission,57 the California Court of Appeal had validated exposing
public employees as a class to mandatory polygraph testing. In Civil
Service, the court of appeal held that dismissing public employees,
who were not public safety officers, for refusing to take a polygraph
test was not an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the
law. 58 In Civil Service Association, a clerk-stenographer with the
police department claimed she was denied equal protection of the
law when she was fired for her refusal to take a polygraph test.59
The California Supreme Court in Long Beach overruled Civil Service
49. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
50. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp. 1986).
51. Id.
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980).
53. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 767-68, 557 P.2d 929, 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 368
(1976).
54. Id.
55. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
56. Id.
57. 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1983), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
58. Id. at 458, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
59. Id. at 453, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (authorities suspected appellant of taking narcotics
from the crime lab).
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Association on the basis that the appellate court in Civil Service
Association had failed to consider the overinclusive and underinclu-
sive nature of the public safety officer definition.' 0 Moreover, in
Civil Service Association, the appellant had not challenged section
3307 on the basis that compulsory polygraph exams invade the
fundamental right to privacy.6 Consequently, the Civil Service As-
sociation court incorrectly used a rational basis test to assess the
validity of the classifications created in section 3307.62 The Long
Beach court indicated that the Civil Service Association court should
have applied the stricter "compelling state interest" standard to
measure the legislature's justification for enacting section 3307.63
The City of Long Beach contended that a public employee could
not claim that the right to privacy affords protection from compul-
sory polygraph testing because a public employee does not have a
right to continued public employment. 64 This proposition suggests
that public employees waive constitutional rights in exchange for
public employment. 6 While the court in Long Beach reaffirmed that
an employee does not have a constitutional right to public employ-
ment,6 the court nevertheless held that an employee may not be
60. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 951 n.18, 719 P.2d at 668 n.18, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98 n.18.
The definition of public safety officer did not include certain job positions commonly thought
of as critical to the health and welfare of the public. Therefore, the Long Beach court reasoned
that the classification in § 3307 was not tailored to achieving the purported goal of preventing
job interruptions in critical public services. Id. at 955, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
See infra notes 83-84 (providing examples of public safety officer occupations and positions
not covered by the public safety officer definition).
61. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 951 n.18, 719 P.2d at 668 n.18, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98 n.18.
62. Id. at 951, 719 P.2d at 668, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (noting that Civil Service Ass'n
used a "rational basis" test. The California Supreme Court in Long Beach applied the stricter
"compelling state interest" standard).
63. Id. at 951 n.18, 719 P.2d at 668 n.18, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98 n.18 (overruling the
holding of Civil Service Ass'n).
64. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 950, 719 P.2d at 668, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98. If the City
could successfully challenge the employees' assertion of a constitutional right to privacy, then
the City would only have to show that the classifications were rationally related to achieving
a legitimate state interest and would not have to meet the higher standard of a compelling
state interest. Id.
65. A public employee may be dismissed without cause, notice, or a hearing. An exception
exists, however, when the employee is dismissed for exercising a constitutional right. Ball v.
City Council, 252 Cal. App. 2d 136, 141, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141-42 (1967). See also Bogacki
v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 783, 489 P.2d 537, 545, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 665 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972). In Bogacki, the court noted that a public employee is
"subject to removal without judicially cognizable good cause" unless the employee can show
that retaining employment required the waiver of a constitutional right. Id.
66. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 952, 719 P.2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99. See also
Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 503, 421 P.2d 409, 412-13, 55
Cal. Rptr. 401, 404-05 (1966) (an individual does not have a constitutional right to continued
public employment).
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deprived of a basic constitutional right in return for public employ-
ment.67 Since involuntary polygraph testing infringes upon the fun-
damental right to privacy, the state must demonstrate a compelling
state interest for the discriminatory classifications. 68
Having determined the appropriate standard of review, the Long
Beach court analyzed the City's justifications for discriminating be-
tween public and private employees. 69 First, the City contended that
a public employee occupies a special position of trust and responsi-
bility to the public.70 Although the supreme court recognized that
the "public trustee" argument had some merit 7' the court did not
find this interest to be sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion
into the employee's privacy. 72
The City next asserted that the public has a right to an honest
and impartial government.73  In County of Nevada v. MacMillan,74
the California Supreme Court acknowledged that preventing the theft
of public money is a compelling state interest.75 The supreme court
in Long Beach reaffirmed the state's compelling interest in ensuring
the integrity of public servants. 76 The court, however, was not per-
suaded that involuntary polygraph exams were the least intrusive way
to achieve this governmental objective.7 7 Moreover, the court did not
67. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 952, 719 P. 2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99. See also
County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 590,
699 P.2d 835, 853, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 442 (1985) (legal distinctions between public and
private sector employees that operate to abridge basic rights cannot withstand judicial scrutiny
unless justified by a compelling governmental interest), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 408 (1985).
68. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
69. Id. at 952, 719 P.2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
70. Id. A public employee is "directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city
or State which is his employer ... He is a trustee of the public interest, bearing the burden
of great and total responsibility to his public employer." Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273,
277-78 (1968). Cf. Civil Service Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (in
dicta, the Civil Service Ass'n court indicated that had Labor Code § 432.2 been challenged
by the appellant, the "public trustee" argument would have justified the classification between
public and private employees).
71. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 952, 719 P.2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 953, 719 P.2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
74. 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974).
75. Id. at 675-76, 522 P.2d at 1353-54, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54. In MacMillan, the
California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute requiring public officials to
disclose financial assets that could conflict with their public duties. The court found that the
public's interest in an "honest and impartial government" outweighed the officials' privacy
interests. Id.
76. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 953, 719 P.2d at 670, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See also
Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 864, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468
(1976) (the right of privacy does not necessarily prevail over the right of the public to an
honest and impartial government), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977).
77. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 953, 719 P.2d at 670, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 100. When
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view the classification exposing all public employees, except public
safety officers, to involuntary polygraph exams as necessary to further
a compelling state interest. 78 The court was influenced by the fact
that polygraph testing of ordinary public employees traditionally had
been viewed as nonessential to the public interest, while the testing
of police officers had been considered necessary to preserve public
safety.79
Finally, the City argued that Government Code section 3307 in-
sulated public safety officers from compulsory polygraph examina-
tions to prevent work interruptions in critical public services.80 To
promote labor harmony and prevent strikes that would jeopardize
public safety, the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights'
was enacted. The statute includes a section which exempts public
safety officers from compulsory polygraph exams.8 2 The title "public
safety officer" covers a broad range of positions, such as police
officers and enforcement personnel of the California Horse Racing
Commission,83 but fails to include some occupations critical to main-
taining public safety, such as firefighters.84 The court in Long Beach
engaging in an analysis of the constitutionality of a legislative classification that affects a
fundamental right, the court must address whether less intrusive alternatives exist which could
further the compelling governmental aim as effectively. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp.
Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 507, 421 P.2d 409, 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1966). See also supra
note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional standard applied when a funda-
mental right is infringed upon by the challenged legislation).
78. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 952, 719 P.2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
79. Id. at 953, 719 P.2d at 670, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See, e.g., Szmaciarz v. State
Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 915-16, 145 Cal. Rptr. 396, 401-02 (1978) (dismissal of
a correctional officer who refused to submit to a polygraph test upheld); Fichera v. State
Personnel Bd., 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 622, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1963) (dismissal of a
California State police officer who refused to submit to a polygraph test upheld); Frazee v.
Civil Service Bd., 170 Cal. App. 2d 333, 335, 338 P.2d 943, 945 (1959) (dismissal of a police
officer who refused to submit to a polygraph test upheld); McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App.
2d 174, 177-78, 324 P.2d 923, 926 (1958) (dismissal of a police officer who refused to submit
to a polygraph test upheld).
80. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 954, 719 P.2d at 671, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3300-3311 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
82. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980). See also Freedman, The Public Safety Officers
Procedural Bill of Rights: An Analysis, 54 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. 2, 4 (1982).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.3(e) (West Supp. 1986). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.3(a)
(West Supp. 1986) (certain employees of the Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control);
id. § 830.3(d) (West Supp. 1986) (certain employees of the Department of Motor Vehicles);
id. § 830.3(i) (West Supp. 1986) (investigators for the state Departments of Social Services
and Mental Health Developmental Services); id. § 830.31(b) (West 1985) (park rangers); id. §
830.31(d) (West 1985) (welfare fraud investigators).
84. The following code sections provide examples of some of the occupations specifically
excluded from the definition of "public safety officer" under Government Code § 3301 (West
Supp. 1986): CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.31(f) (West 1985) (coroners); id. § 830.6 (West 1985)
(reserve and auxiliary sheriffs); id. § 831 (West 1985) (custodial officers who are responsible
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found the classification in Government Code section 3307 both
overinclusive and underinclusive.8 5 Therefore, the court determined
that the City had failed to establish that the legislative distinction
between "public safety officers" and all other public employees was
narrowly tailored to achieving the goal of preventing work stoppages
in essential public services . 6
In conclusion, the California Supreme Court ruled that compulsory
polygraph testing infringed upon the Long Beach Marine Bureau
employees' fundamental right to privacy, but did not consider whether
a compelling state interest warranted this invasion of privacy. 87 The
court further held that the City had not met the burden of establishing
that the legislative classifications exposing ordinary public employees
to involuntary polygraph testing were a necessary, narrowly tailored
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 8 Thus, the
statutory scheme discriminating against public employees, other than
public safety officers, unconstitutionally denied ordinary public em-
ployees equal protection of the law.89
C. Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rose Bird agreed with the
determination of the majority that requiring public employees to
submit to polygraph tests as a condition of continued employment
creates an unconstitutional burden on the employees' right to pri-
vacy. 90 The Chief Justice contended that the majority should have
pursued the issue of whether the City had a compelling state interest
to justify the invasion of the employee's privacy, instead of engaging
in an equal protection analysis.9' Therefore, the concurring opinion
addressed whether the invasion of the employees' right to privacy
was unconstitutional. 92
for maintaining custody of prisoners in local detention facilities); and id. § 831.6 (West 1985)
(transportation officers who are responsible for the transportation of prisoners). Generally,
firefighters are also excluded from the definition of public safety officer except when they are
acting as arson investigators or are enforcing laws relating to fire prevention and suppression.
Id. § 830.31(a) (West 1985).
85. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 955, 719 P.2d at 671, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
86. Id. at 955-56, 719 P.2d at 671-72, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
87. Id. at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 958, 719 P.2d at 673, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
92. Id.
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Chief Justice Bird reviewed the significance and scope of Califor-
nia's right to privacy. 93 She regarded California statutes regulating
the dissemination of personal information as evidence of the con-
certed effort to curtail governmental erosion of constitutional liber-
ties.94 In addition, she noted the concerns of the California judiciary
about the double-edged sword of technological progress cutting against
traditional individual freedoms. 91 The Chief Justice identified the
polygraph as a device specifically designed to discover an individual's
uncommunicated thoughts and emotions. 96 Chief Justice Bird deter-
mined that requiring employees to take polygraphs in order to retain
employment was equivalent to forcing employees to waive their
constitutional right to privacy. 97 She then applied a three-part test
developed by the California Supreme Court in Bagley v. Washington
Township Hospital District.9 The three-pronged test ensures that the
waiver is necessitated by a compelling state interest. 99
Under the first part of the Bagley test, the state must establish
that the condition of employment is reasonably related to the pur-
poses of the legislation that confers the benefit.10° Finding that the
use of polygraph examinations to investigate thefts by public em-
ployees satisfied the first requirement of Bagley,'0 ' Chief Justice Bird
reasoned that ensuring responsibility at work by using polygraph
testing is reasonably related to the privilege of public employment. 02
The second Bagley test requires the government establish that the
93. Id. at 957, 719 P.2d at 672-73, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
94. Id. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1986) (ensures that
every adult retains control over major medical care decisions); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1799
(West 1985 & Supp. 1986) (regulates the dissemination of personal information); CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 67140-67147.5 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) (regulates the dissemination of academic
records); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1785.1-1785.35, 1786-1787.3, 1799-1799.2 (\Vest 1983) (regulates
the dissemination of business records).
95. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 957, 719 P.2d at 673, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 103. See Burrows
v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 248, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974).
96. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 958, 719 P.2d at 673, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
97. Id. at 958, 719 P.2d at 674, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
98. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (1966).
99. "Restrictions on public employees, which in some or all of their applications, advance
no compelling public interest commensurate with the waiver of constitutional rights which they
require imperil the continued operation of our institutions of representative government."
Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 510-11, 421 P.2d at 417, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 409. See also Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 289 n.2, 625 P.2d 779, 801 n.2, 172
Cal. Rptr. 866, 888 n.2 (1981) (Bird, C.J., concurring, notes that the Bagley standard has
been exclusively applied to cases which involved restrictions on fundamental rights as a de
facto strict scrutiny standard).
100. Id. at 501, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
101. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 959, 719 P.2d at 674, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
102. Id.
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value accruing to the public outweighs the burden imposed upon the
constitutional right.'0 3 The Chief Justice determined that the minimal
benefits the City obtained from the administration of involuntary
polygraph tests,' °4 reduced further by the exam's unreliability, 0 5 did
not outweigh the severe impairment of the individual's right to
privacy.' °6 The third test of Bagley requires the government show
that no less intrusive alternative means exist to achieve the govern-
mental objective.'0 7 Determining that the City failed to meet the third
part of test,'10 the concurring opinion pointed out that the verbal
interrogation remains as a viable investigative method. '" 9 In conclu-
sion, Chief Justice Bird would have held that forcing a public
employee to take a polygraph examination is an unconstitutional
violation of the employee's fundamental right to privacy."10
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of Labor Code Section 432.2
Assembly Bill 927 was enacted as Labor Code section 432.2 in
1963.' As originally drafted, section 432.2 prohibited all employers
from requiring employees to submit to lie detector tests." 2 In response
to the opposition of law enforcement agencies," 3 the bill was sub-
sequently changed and reintroduced to provide that the restriction
on the administration of compulsory polygraph testing did not apply
to government agencies. '
4
103. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 501-02, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
104. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text (discussion of state interests asserted by
the City in Long Beach).
105. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussion of the unreliability of the
polygraph).
106. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 959-60, 719 P.2d at 674-75, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
107. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 501-02, 421 P.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
108. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 961, 719 P.2d at 675, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 961, 719 P.2d at 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
Ill. Governor's Press Release No. 588, July 19, 1963, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief by
Attorneys for the AFL-CIO in support of Petitioner, Long Beach City Employees Association
v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986), Appendix A
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief] (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
112. A.B. 666, 1961-62, 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1961) (submitted January 24, 1961), quoted
in Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 111, at 6.
113. Bill Memorandum accompanying A.B. 927, June 25, 1963, by Paul D. Ward, Legis-
lative Secretary to Governor Brown, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 111, at
Appendix E. Professional polygraph examiners and employers' groups continued to oppose
unsuccessfully A.B. 927. Id.
114. A.B. 927, 1963-64, 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1963).
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The motivation for enacting section 432.2 was the unreliability of
polygraph exam results,"' in light of the detrimental impact the
results had on employment relationships.'" 6 Legislative materials do
not indicate the policy rationale for statutorily distinguishing between
private and public employees." 7 Prior case law suggests, however,
that since public employees occupy a special position of trust, they
must yield some of the privileges retained by their counterparts in
the private workforce.""
B. Legislative History of Government Code Section 3307
Assembly Bill 301 became law in 1976 as Government Code section
3307." 9 Section 3307 protects public safety officers from having to
choose between taking a lie detector test and losing their jobs. 20 The
title of "public safety officer" covers a variety of work positions,
including park rangers and investigators of the Board of Dental
Examiners.' 2' Certain personnel, such as firefighters and auxiliary
police officers, were excluded from the definition of "public safety
115. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of the
polygraph test).
116. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 111, at Appendix A. See also Review of Selected
1963 Legislation, 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 734 (1963); 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 25 (Cal. 1964) (inaccurate
results could lead to an unwarranted dismissal).
117. See Governor's Press Release No. 588, July 19, 1963; Memorandum on A.B. 927,
June 18, 1963, by Administrator, Dept. of Employment, to Legislative Secretary, Governor's
Office; Bill Memorandum accompanying A.B. 927, June 25, 1963, by Paul D. Ward, Legislative
Secretary to Governor Brown, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note I 11, at Appendices
A, B, and E (these materials state that a distinction between the protection afforded private
and public employees is created by A.B. 927, but do not suggest the basis for the discrimi-
nation).
118. In Civil Service Ass'n, the Court of Appeal stated:
[l1n the 'course of his work, a public officer or employee must yield some of the
privileges which are enjoyed by the citizenry at large.' .. ." Unlike a private
employee, a public employee is "directly, immediately and entirely responsible to
the city or State which is his [or her] employer.... He [or she] is a trustee of the
public interest, bearing the burden of great and total responsibility to his for her]
public employer." ... While a public employee cannot be forced to give an answer
which may tend to incriminate him or her in criminal proceedings, he may be
required to choose between disclosing information and losing his employment....
Civil Service Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (quoting Szmaciarz v.
State Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 145 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1978); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968); and citing Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Educ., 44 Cal. 2d 816,
285 P.2d 617 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956)).
119. A.B. 301, 1975-76, 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1975); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3301 (West 1980
& Supp. 1986) (section 3301 is also referred to as Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of
Rights Act).
120. Freedman, supra note 82, at 4.
121. See supra note 83 (examples of public safety officer occupations).
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officer" under section 3307. 122 The seemingly arbitrary classification
of these occupations supports the determination by the court that
the categories were both underinclusive and overinclusive.
Like the rationale underlying Labor Code section 432.2, the pur-
pose of Government Code section 3307 is to shield employees from
the repercussions of inaccurate polygraph exam results. 23 The legis-
lature also stated that "effective law enforcement depends upon the
maintenance of stable employer-employee relations."' 24 Notably, the
public trust theory that a public officer is in a greater position of
responsibility towards the public than a private employee did not
prevent the California Legislature from passing Government Code
section 3307. The opposition to Government Code section 3307 had
in fact unsuccessfully challenged the proposed legislation on the
"public trust" theory.' 25 Some municipalities had contended that
Government Code section 3307 should not be limited to protecting
only public safety officers from compulsory polygraph exams while
122. See supra note 84 (examples of occupations not included within the public safety
officer definition).
123. Writing in support of the passage of A.B. 301, the Los Angeles Police Protective
League addressed the necessity of enacting legislation prohibiting polygraph testing:
Section 3307, dealing with the polygraph is especially crucial to the officers of the
Los Angeles Police Department. The Los Angeles Police Department's Internal
Affairs Division gave more polygraph examinations to police officers last year than
any other police department in the State of California. We have records to show
that in instances within the City officers were given as many as eight polygraph
examinations and although the examination was non-conclusive, the officers were
still disciplined. In several instances the officers were ordered under threat of being
fired to continue to take polygraph examinations until a reading that was acceptable
to the department was obtained. In the past, investigators from Internal Affairs
Division, upon investigating alleged acts of misconduct, forced the officer to reveal
all of his assets and liabilities as well as those of his wife and other members of his
family.
Position Paper on A.B. 301, submitted July 25, 1975, by Los Angeles Police Protective League
to Senate Judiciary Committee, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 11, at Appendix
C.
124. Section 3301 of the Government Code provides in part:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the right and protections provided to
peace officers under this chapter constitute a matter of state-wide concern. The
Legislature further finds and declares that effective law enforcement depends upon
the maintenance of stable employer-employee relations, between public safety em-
ployees and their employers. In order to assure that such stable relations are continued
throughout the state and to further assure that effective services are provided to all
people of the state, it is necessary that this chapter be applicable to all public safety
officers, as defined in this section, wherever situated within the State of California.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3301 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
125. Letter dated August 8, 1975, from California Peace Officers' Association to Senator
Song; Letter dated August 13, 1976, from California Peace Officers' Association to Governor
Brown; Letter dated August 17, 1976, from League of California Cities to Legislative Section
of Governor's Office, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 111, at Appendices F-H.
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neglecting to afford the same protection to other public employees. 126
Ironically, prior to the enactment of section 3307, all of the California
cases allowing dismissal for refusing to submit to a polygraph exam
dealt with police officers.' 27
C. The Unreliability of the Polygraph
In California, the results of polygraph examinations are inadmiss-
able in judicial and administrative proceedings because they are
deemed unreliable. 2 8 In Fichera v. State Personnel Board,'29 the court
of appeal conceded that while results from polygraph tests are not
admissible as evidence, polygraph examinations serve a useful purpose
by limiting and channeling investigations.' 0 The Fichera court spec-
ulated that when more than one person is selected for a polygraph
test the polygraph examination might be used as an "instrument of
exculpation and vindication.' ' 3' The polygraph industry claims eighty-
five to ninety-five percent reliability in detecting deception., 2 Some
scientific studies have indicated, however, that the accuracy of the
polygraph lies within the fifty percentile range.'"
Several factors contribute to the unreliability of the polygraph
examination. First, lie-detection is based on the premise that deceit
causes internal conflict, which purportedly produces certain physio-
logical reactions. 34 The premise that deceit will be physiologically
126. Letter dated August 17, 1975, from League of California Cities to Legislative Section
of Governor's Office, quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 111, at Appendix H.
127. The following cases involving the dismissal of police officers for refusing to submit
to a polygraph exam were decided before the enactment of Government Code § 3301: Fichera
v. State Personnel Bd., 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1963); Frazee v. Civil Serv.
Bd., 170 Cal. App. 2d 333, 338 P.2d 943 (1959); McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174,
324 P.2d 923 (1958).
128. People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 653, 343 P.2d 577, 588 (1959) (reaffirming that the
results of lie detector tests are not admissable in a criminal case because of a lack of scientific
certainty about the results), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 926 (1960); Aengst v. Board of Medical
Quality Assurance, 110 Cal. App. 3d 275, 282-83, 167 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1980) (polygraph
results excluded from an administrative hearing).
129. 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1963).
130. Id. at 622, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
131. Id. In Fichera, five California State Police officers were ordered to take polygraph
examinations. The court reasoned that when more than one person is tested the results might
narrow the field of suspects by showing who is not the guilty party. Id.
132. Kleinmetz, supra note 11, at 35.
133. Id. at 37. A study conducted by the Office of Technological Assessment concluded
that no scientific evidence established the validity of polygraphs to detect security leaks or to
screen employees. Silas, Lie Box Battle: Workers Challenge Polygraphs, 70 A.B.A. J., Feb.
1984, at 34 (citing Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, OTA Congressional Bd. of 98th
Cong. (Nov. 1983)).
134. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing the administration of a
polygraph test).
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reflected is not always true. 35 Second, for the examinee to be
responsive, the examinee must fear detection. 3 6 One of the objectives
of the pretest interview 3 7 is to instill in the examinee the feeling that
any deceit will be detected.'38 If the examinee does not believe that
the polygraph can detect deceit, the lying examinee may be able to
escape detection. 39 Another major cause of inaccurate polygraph
exam results is the reliance on the subjective interpretative skills of
the examiner. 40 According to experts, examiners should possess at
least five years of investigative experience and a college degree. 4'
Experts estimate that only about twenty percent of all examiners
have met these qualifications. 42 Finally, because the administration
of a polygraph exam is a commercial endeavor for the examiner, the
examiner may be financially motivated to satisfy the client by pro-
ducing a guilty individual. 43
In addition to the unreliability inherent in the administration of
the polygraph exam,' 44 several tactics can sabotage the accuracy of
the polygraph results. An examinee cannot prevent a physiological
reaction simply by remaining silent. 45 The examinee may, however,
manifest certain physical responses to counter the physiological re-
135. Some people lie with ease- for example, the psychopathic liar-while other people
have a much lower guilt threshold. Kleinmetz, supra note 11, at 34. See also Hartsfield,
Polygraphs, 36 LAB. L.J. 817, 829-30 (1985) (listing the findings of Scientific Validity of
Polygraph Testing, OTA Congressional Bd. of 98th Cong. (Nov. 1983)); Skolnick, supra note
II, at 700.
136. Gardner, supra note 11, at 303.
137. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussion of pretest interview).
138. Hartsfield, supra note 135, at 829. See also Skolnick, supra note 11, at 704.
139. Skolnick, supra note 11, at 705.
140. Id. Experienced examiners made an average of 91.4% correct judgments while inex-
perienced examiners had an average of 77.5% correct judgments. Hartsfield, supra note 135,
at 830; Comment, supra note 11, at 124.
141. Gardner, supra note 11, at 305 (relying on Hearing on the Use of Polygraph and
Similar Devices By Federal Agencies Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and
Government Information of the House Committee on Government Operations, 93rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. 784 (1974) (statement of Senator Sam Ervin)).
142. Id. California has not enacted legislation regulating the qualifications of a polygraph
examiner. Comment, supra note 11, at 124, 127. But cf. ALA. CODE § 34-25.21(5) (1985);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2703 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-36-6 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 111, para. 2412 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 338.1710 (West
1978); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-29-13 (1972); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit 59, § 1458 (West Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 703.090 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-53-70 (Law. Co-op 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-37-5 (Supp. 1986) (various state code sections requiring that polygraph
examiners possess either a baccalaureate degree or complete five years experience as an
interrogator to qualify to be a licensed polygraph examiner).
143. Burkey, Privacy, Property, and the Polygraph, 18 LAB. L.J. 79, 80 (1967).
144. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
145. Gardner, supra note 11, at 306.
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actions typically exhibited by an examinee who is lying. 46 Also,
ingesting alcohol or certain drugs prior to the polygraph examination
may permit an examinee to avoid detection. 47 For example, only
thirty percent of guilty subjects who had taken the tranquilizer
Meprobamat were identified as deceptive. 148 The availability of such
methods further defeats the reliability and utility of the polygraph.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Of the twenty-two states and the District of Columbia that have
limited polygraph testing, only California has distinguished between
the protection afforded private and public employees. 49 As a result
of the Long Beach decision, forced polygraph testing of public
employees is no longer permitted in California 50 Nevertheless, some
major California cities intend to continue using the polygraph in
preemployment interviews.' The California Supreme Court in Long
Beach did not address the issue of whether applicants for jobs in the
public sector may be required to take a polygraph test. Additionally,
the Long Beach decision may signal the approach of California
courts to the right to privacy issue raised in cases challenging random
drug testing. 52
A. Preemployment Screening
Screening job applicants is one of the most widespread uses of the
polygraph exam.'53 In preemployment screening, the employer uses
146. Comment, supra note 11, at 116-17 (relying on Hearings on Polygraph Control and
Civil Liberties Protection Act Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 263 (1977-1978) (statement of David
F. Linowes)). Toe-pressing reduced detection of deceit from 75% to 10%o. Persons trained in
hypnosis and biofeedback can reduce detectability. Also, wearing antiperspirant or clear nail
polish on tips of fingers may further decrease the accuracy of the polygraph results. Hartsfield,
supra note 135, at 830.
147. Hartsfield, supra note 135, at 830.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 817.
150. See Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 937, 719 P.2d at 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
151. The Los Angeles and Long Beach Police Departments will continue to test police
recruits with a polygraph. Morian, High Court Limits Forced Tests of Public Workers by
Polygraph, L.A. Times, June 20, 1986, § I, at 3, col. 1. The San Jose Police Department also
may continue to polygraph test job applicants. However, in light of the Long Beach decision,
San Francisco may discontinue use of the polygraph in preemployment interviews. Milstein,
State Court Limits Polygraph Use, San Francisco Chronicle, June 20, 1986, at 16, col. 1.
152. Currently, a case addressing random drug testing is before the San Francisco Superior
Court. In Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation, No. 843230 (San Fran. Super. Ct. 1986),
Luck is challenging her dismissal for refusing to submit to a drug test required of 489 employees
of Southern Pacific. In addition to alleging wrongful discharge, Luck is claiming an invasion
of privacy. Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, 6 CAL. LAW. 28, 29 (April 1986).
153. Hayden, supra note 11, at 18.
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the polygraph to uncover potential job-related problems that could
remain undetected in the traditional office interview. 54 In a typical
preemployment polygraph examination, the prospective employee is
asked a wide range of questions about past dishonest and criminal
activities, past work records, mental or physical problems, political
activities, and social associations.'" The focus of the exam is on all
aspects of the applicant's life, not specific work issues.' 6 Therefore,
the questions are not narrowly and specifically framed as the United
States Supreme Court mandated in Gardner v. Broderick.5 7 Fre-
quently, the examinee who is not hired following a polygraph test
was not selected because of admissions made during the testing,
rather than because of conclusive physiological indicators of deceit. 58
In the preemployment situation, the polygraph exam is even less
reliable than when used strictly as an investigative device. 5 9 One of
the primary reasons for the increased unreliability in the preemploy-
ment situation is that the screening examiner poses very broad general
questions. 60 Since the polygraph was designed to detect whether the
examinee is lying with respect to a specific incident under investiga-
tion, at least one legal scholar questions the ability of the polygraph
to predict accurately whether the examinee will be a good worker or
will steal.16 ' Another leading cause for the greater unreliability in
preemployment polygraph tests is that the examiner has to make
valid predictions about the applicant's future behavior based on
responses to questions about past and present behavior. 62
In Long Beach, public employees successfully challenged compul-
sory polygraph testing based on the dual legislative classifications
created by Labor Code section 432.2 and Government Code section
154. Call, Polygraph Regulations: A Trend Toward Tougher Standards, I1 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 585, 586 (1986).
155. Hermann, supra note 13, at 82-83. See also Hurd, Use of the Polygraph in Screening
Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 529, 538 (1985). An applicant for a firefighter position was
allegedly asked whether he had sex with animals, whether he had sex with men, whether he
had ever touched a child with sexual intent, and whether he had ever cheated on his wife.
Gardner, supra note 11, at 299 (citing from The Phil Donahue Show, Companies that Require
Employees to Take Lie Detector Examinations, April 14, 1986).
156. Hermann, supra note 13, at 85-86. See also Hurd, supra note 155, at 536.
157. 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968).
158. Wise, Trial By Machine, 12 HuM. RTs., Fall 1984, at 30, 32-33.
159. Comment, supra note 11, at 125-26.
160. Hermann, supra note 13, at 85.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 11, at 125-26; Hurd, supra note 155, at 536.
According to the American Polygraph Association, "[Fluture predictions are highly specula-
tive." Gardner, supra note 11, at 317 n.159. But see Hurd, supra note 155, at 540 ("the worst
that can be said about polygraph testing is that a lie detector is in general not any more
unreliable or unreasonable than other methods traditionally used in screening job applicants").
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3307.163 Labor Code section 432.2 prohibits a private employer from
requiring a prospective employee to take a polygraph test, but this
restriction does not apply to public employers.' 64 Therefore, an
argument might be made that applicants for public positions who
are forced to submit to polygraph exams are unconstitutionally denied
equal protection of the law. Significantly, however, the dual legis-
lative classification, discussed in the Long Beach case, does not exist
in the situation confronting a prospective public employee. Govern-
ment Code section 3307, shielding public safety officers from invol-
untary polygraph testing, does not protect applicants for public safety
officer positions. 65 The only statutory classification which exists in
the prospective employee situation is the distinction between appli-
cants for public employment and applicants for private employ-
ment.16 The public interest in ensuring that persons with integrity
are employed in public service positions may justify discriminating
between applicants for public employment and applicants for private
employment.
While the Long Beach decision may not support an equal protection
challenge made by an applicant for public employment, Chief Justice
Bird's rationale in her concurring opinion may present a viable
argument for claiming an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.' 7
Nevertheless, applying an invasion of privacy analysis to the situation
of a prospective employee may be problematic. Prospective employees
who are considered ineligible for a position because of their refusal
to take a polygraph test do not suffer the same type of compulsion
as a public employee who is fired for refusing to take the test. An
employee who refuses to take a polygraph test faces termination. In
contrast, an applicant who refuses to take a polygraph test will
merely lose a job opportunity. Consequently, the prospective em-
ployee's agreement to take a polygraph test might be considered an
act of a more voluntary nature than the acquiescence of an employee
fearing dismissal.
In Long Beach, the court reaffirmed the notion that a citizen does
not have a constitutional right to continued public employment. 6
163. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
164. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp. 1986).
165. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980) (the section expressly applies to public safety
officers).
166. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp. 1986) (the section expressly affords protection
from involuntary polygraph testing job applicants in the private sector).
167. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 959-61, 719 P.2d at 674-76, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104-06.
168. Id. at 951-52, 719 P.2d at 668-69, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99.
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The court clarified, however, that a citizen may not be forced to
waive a constitutional right in order to retain public employment 169
The court further indicated that, absent a compelling stateinterest,
the government may not intrude upon the individual's right to
privacy. 70 The wide scope of questioning conducted in the preem-
ployment polygraph interview is potentially far more intrusive than
the internal investigative use of the polygraph."' Requiring job
applicants to take polygraph tests in order to be considered for
employment effectively conditions obtaining public employment upon
the waiver of the constitutional right to privacy. The public interest
in an honest and impartial government might be a compelling enough
interest to require applicants to waive the right to privacy in order
to secure public employment. 72
Due to the unreliability of polygraph results, less intrusive and
equally accurate methods are available to evaluate the qualifications
of a prospective employee. 7 1 One example of a less intrusive alter-
native is the traditional verbal interview, in which the applicant may
choose to remain silent without the interviewer obtaining information
from the applicant's physiological response to the question. 74 Since
most hiring decisions are based on highly subjective judgments by
personnel directors, additional subjective predictions derived from an
intrusive polygraph test may be unnecessary. 75
B. Random Drug Testing
The decision in Long Beach indicates the strong resistance of the
California Supreme Court to allow government measures that intrude
upon the worker's right to privacy. This deference to an employee's
right to privacy may be particularly relevant in light of the increasing
prevalence of random drug testing. 76 The nation's growing concern
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Hayden, supra note !1, at 18 (see insert "Subterfuge Posing as Science," comparing
the questioning and degree of interpretation used in a preemployment polygraph test to that
used in a criminal investigative polygraph test).
172. But see Hermann, supra note 13, at 85-86 ("the use of the polygraph in pre-
employment screening even in critical areas such as national security, is ill-conceived since
those individuals who are supposed to be ferreted out by the test often go undetected").
173. Hermann, supra note 13, at 85-86 (discussing the unreliablity of polygraph results).
174. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 961, 719 P.2d at 675, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
175. Hurd, supra note 155, at 535 (noting the subjective nature of hiring decisions).
176. Uncovering New Truths About the Country's No. 1 Menace, U.S. News & World
Report, July 28, 1986, at 51. Twenty-five percent of the largest United States corporations
now screen work applicants for drug usage. Likewise, testing has infiltrated the sports world
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over the influence of drugs at the workplace has motivated employers
to implement drug testing programs. 77 One of the strongest consti-
tutional challenges to random drug testing is likely to be that the
worker is being unreasonably searched in violation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 178 In addition to the
fourth amendment issue, the right to privacy may provide a basis
for attacking the administration of random drug tests on a consti-
tutional basis.
Random drug tests do not require that an employer have probable
cause to test an employee suspected of being under the influence of
drugs.1' 9 In a random drug test, the subject is required to submit a
urine sample for a drug analysis80 even though the subject did not
exhibit any signs of being under the influence of drugs at the
workplace. According to established drug laboratories, none of the
available drug test methods measure the subject's level of intoxication
or impairment, or reveal how long the drug has been present in the
system.' 8  Because some drugs stay in the system for days, workers
contend that random drug testing allows companies to compile in-
and is a commonplace occurrence for train and subway operators, air traffic controllers, airline
pilots, and military personnel. Id.
177. Lehrman, Testing Labs Lead Charge in Nation's War on Drugs, San Francisco
Examiner, August 24, 1986, at A-I, col. I.
Experts predict that half the Fortune 500 companies will have a drug testing program
within the next three years, up from 25 percent now ... More than 100,000 civilian
federal employees in California face mandatory testing if the [Reagan] administra-
tion's latest proposal to test workers with access to secret or "sensitive" information
takes effect.
Id.
178. Marcotte, Drugs at Work, 72 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1986, at 34. See, e.g., Capua v. City
of Plainsfield, 55 U.S.L.W. 2170 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 1986) (No. 86-2992) (holding random drug
testing of city firefighters and police department employees violative of citizen's constitutional
right to privacy).
179. See, e.g., People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956) (routine searches of
vehicles to "curb the juvenile problem" in violation of the constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures (U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 19)). This
case illustrates that without probable cause, searches are conducted on a random basis.
Similarly, random drug testing is conducted without probable cause to suspect an employee is
under the influence.
180. Lehrman, supra note 177, at A-4, col. 1. One news article points out the invasion of
privacy which results in the administration of the urinalysis test: "The judge noted that urine
testing which is done in the presence of another person to assure the reliability of a specimen
involves 'one of the most private functions."' Navarez, Urine Tests for Drugs in Government
Struck Down, Sacramento Bee, Sept. 19, 1986, at A-26 (reporting on a ruling delivered by
Federal District Court Judge Sarokin on September 18, 1986 in Newark, New Jersey).
181. Lehrman, supra note 177, at A-4, cot. 1 (the laboratories discussed in the Lehrman
article are PharmChem Laboratories in California, Syntex Corp. of California, and Roche
Biomedical Laboratories, Inc. in New Jersey; the drug test methods considered do not include
methods testing for'alcohol).
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formation about off-the-job recreational use of illegal drugs. 8 2
The Long Beach court's finding that polygraph testing invades a
worker's privacy may be analogized to the random drug testing
situation. Under Long Beach, the threshold inquiry is whether the
test process elicits information unrelated to the work performance of
the employee.18  The court in Long Beach emphasized that questions
should be specifically, directly, and narrowly related to the perform-
ance of the employee's duties. 84 Since the recreational usage of drugs
is illegal in California,'85 one might contend that drug testing reveals
whether an employee has engaged in illegal activities. The California
Supreme Court in Long Beach indicated that some questions about
illegal activities asked by the polygraph examiner were overly broad
and intrusive. 8 6 The Long Beach opinion suggests that the right to
privacy encompasses the right of the individual to decide when and
what acts should be disclosed to others. 87
If random drug testing in the public sector infringes upon the
fundamental right to privacy, then the state will have to demonstrate
a compelling interest warranting the invasion of privacy.' 8  The
majority opinion in Long Beach did not address whether the City's
interests in compulsory polygraph tests were sufficient to infringe
upon the worker's right to privacy18 9 Instead, the court considered
whether the City's interests justified the discrimination against public
employees created by the legislative classification in Labor Code
182. Bishop, supra note 152, at 29. Marijuana may remain in the system up to two weeks;
traces of cocaine and heroin may stay in the body as long as three days. Marcotte, supra note
178, at 35. Marijuana's psychoactive ingredient, delta-9 THC, is absorbed into the bloodstream
through the lungs, creating a high that lasts for approximately two hours. THC is rapidly
broken down by the body into several metabolites. THC is not measured by the urine test
since THC does not stay in the system very long; the metabolites, however, are measured in
a urine sample. The metabolites are assimilated into fatty acid tissues in the body and excreted
gradually. No one knows how long this process takes. Gampel & Zeese, Are Employers
Overdosing on Drug Testing?, 55 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 34 (1985).
183. See Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 943, 719 P.2d at 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
184. Id. at 947, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
185. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350 (West 1975) (possession of any controlled
substance is punishable as a felony). Id. § 11357 (West 1975) (possession of marijuana is
punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony).
186. The Long Beach court provided the following examples of intrusive questions con-
cerning illegal acts directed at the polygraph examinee: "Have you ever written any bad or
insufficient checks in the past three years? ... Have you ever stolen anything? ... Have you
ever touched a child with sexual intent?" Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 946 n.1l, 719 P.2d at
665 n.ll, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95 n.ll.
187. Id. at 944 n.7, 719 P.2d at 663 n.7, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93 n.7.
188. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1966).
189. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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section 432.2 and Government Code section 3307.' 90 Chief Justice
Bird, relying on the decision of the California Supreme Court in
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,9' continued the
privacy analysis in her concurring opinion in Long Beach.192
The Chief Justice evaluated whether the City had a compelling
interest in requiring public employees to take polygraph tests.
93
Similarly, if random drug testing infringes on a fundamental right,
the courts will have to determine whether the state has a compelling
state interest to justify random drug testing. Employers advocating
drug testing contend that drug usage causes absenteeism, lower
productivity, accidents, and poor public image. 94 No research studies,
however, have shown that casual marijuana usage outside of work
necessarily affects on-site work performance. 95 The sufficiency of
state interests in drug testing may vary with the nature of the
employment postion involved. For example, positions involving re-
sponsibility for public safety may warrant drug testing.
Should a court determine that the state has demonstrated a com-
pelling state interest to justify invading the employee's privacy, the
court must then decide whether the means of intrusion are narrowly
tailored to further the interest of the state.' 96 As with polygraph
testing, 97 concerns have been expressed that drug tests are not always
a successful way to detect drug abuse because of the unreliability of
the results. 19 While the drug testing industry claims ninety-five per-
cent accuracy, 99 experts admit that many labs are not adequately
equipped to ensure accuracy in test results. 200 Moreover, ingestion of
190. Id.
191. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966).
192. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 956, 719 P.2d at 672, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
193. Id. at 959, 719 P.2d at 674, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
194. Bishop, supra note 152, at 29.
195. Gampel & Zeese, supra note 182, at 34.
196. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 959-60, 719 P.2d at 674-75, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05. See
also Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 507, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
197. See supra note 128-48 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of polygraph
test results).
198. Researchers for the Center for Disease Control with the National Institute on Drug
Abuse conducted a study in which they submitted samples to thirteen labs, which serviced 262
drug treatment facilities. Samples contained the following drugs and the study indicated the
following range of errors, respectively: Barbituates, 11-94%; amphetamines, 19-100%; meth-
adone, 0-33%; cocaine, 0-100%; codeine, 0-100%; morphine, 5-100%. Also, the range of error
rates on samples which did not contain drugs was significant. Gampel & Zeese, supra note
182, at 34.
199. Lehrman, supra note 175, at A-4, col. 1.
200. Many labs do not have a system to guard against sloppy handling and transportation
of specimens, which is the most common cause of inaccurate tests. Furthermore, many labs
1987 / Long Beach City Employees Ass'n
cold medicines, diet pills, and certain foods201 can alter test results. 20 2
The subject can also sabotage the drug test results, further reducing
the trustworthiness of drug tests. 203 Because some traces of drugs
remain in the system for days, the test may reveal that a subject has
taken a drug even though the subject is no longer under the influence
of the drug. 204 In addition, marijuana may be detected in a subject's
system, without the subject ever having personally smoked the mar-
ijuana cigarette, simply because the subject inhaled marijuana smoke
while others nearby were smoking the substance.205 The inaccuracy
of drug test results reduces the value of the drug test as a tool for
detecting employees who use drugs.
As a final critical consideration for determining the constitution-
ality of random drug testing, the court will examine whether less
intrusive alternatives exist. 206 One alternative to random drug testing
is drug testing only when the employer has probable cause to suspect
that the employee is under the influence of narcotics at work. This
probable cause approach to drug testing would permit the employer
to engage in drug testing to discover information directly related to
the employee's work performance.
CONCLUSION
In Long Beach City Employees Association v. City of Long Beach,
the California Supreme Court held that public employees cannot be
lack the equipment to do confirmation testing. Lehrman, supra note 177, at A-4, col. I
(statements from John Ellsworth, director of marketing for Diagnostic Dimensions, Inc. in
New Jersey).
201. Id. One method of thwarting the drug test is to eat large quantities of poppy seeds,
which may result in a false positive test result. Another approach is to drink huge amounts
of vinegar, which may result in a false negative test result. Id.
202. Id.
203. Uncovering New Truths About the Country's No. I Menace, U.S. News & World
Report, July 28, 1986, at 50, 51. Drinking large amounts of water in order to dilute urine
before the test will decrease reliability of the results. Discussing the extreme measures taken
by some test subjects, U.S. News reported:
To discourage such tampering, urine often must be submitted in bathrooms where
toilet water has been dyed and faucet water turned off to prevent dilution. Monitors
are sometimes used to make sure no substances are added. The temperature of a
sample is usually checked to prevent substitution of someone else's urine; however,
people have been known to tape a urine sample to themselves to keep it at body
temperature. A woman can conceal a substitute sample in her vagina, and even a
monitor won't know where it came from, says one doctor who is drafting testing
guidelines.
Id.
204. See id.
205. Gampel & Zeese, supra note 182, at 35.
206. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 961, 719 P.2d at 675, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 105. See also
Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 507, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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required to submit to a polygraph test. In so ruling, the court declared
that "public employees are not second class citizens within the ken
of the Constitution." 20 7 While the Long Beach court did not invalidate
either Labor Code section 432.2 or Government Code section 3307,
the court did determine that the classifications discriminating against
public employees, who were not public safety officers, were uncon-
stitutional. Consequently, the portion of Labor Code section 432.2
that permitted employers in the public sector to force employees to
take a polygraph test is invalid. In light of the current role polygraph
and drug tests are playing as information-gathering methods for
employers, the Long Beach decision may provide an insight into how
the courts will confront the issue of whether various types of testing
violate an employee's constitutional right to privacy.
Elisabeth A. Madden
207. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d at 951, 719 P.2d at 669, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
